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Monetization—also known as “money-financed fiscal programs” or “money-printing”—
occurs when a government finances itself by issuing currency or other non-interest-bearing 
liabilities, such as bank reserves. It poses real risks—potentially excessive inflation and 
encroachment on central-bank independence—and some paint it as a relic of a bygone era. 
The onset of the COVID-19 crisis, however, forced governments to spend heavily to combat 
the considerable economic and public health impacts. As government deficits climbed, 
monetization re-entered the conversation as a way to avoid the massive debt burdens that 
some nations may face. This paper describes how monetization works, provides key 
historical examples, and examines recent central-bank measures. Based on our definition, 
much of what many are calling monetization today—in particular, central banks directly 
buying massive amounts of their own government’s bonds—is not necessarily monetization. 
To our knowledge, no central bank during the COVID-19 crisis took an action that meets our 
definition or explicitly stated that it was conducting monetization.  
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Governments around the world introduced huge stimulus programs to combat the economic 
damage caused by COVID-19. These programs allocated billions of dollars in direct 
payments, tax breaks, business subsidies, and other relief. The size and scale of these 
programs caused many governments to run much higher budget deficits than normal. But 
how were they going to finance these deficits? One way, which some consider anathema to 
the price-stability mandate of a central bank, was thrust back into the spotlight as the crisis 
raged on: sovereign debt monetization. 
But what exactly is monetization? We define monetization—also known as “money-financed 
fiscal programs” or “money-printing”—as any effort by a government to finance itself by 
issuing non-interest-bearing liabilities. Those liabilities could be currency, or they could be 
bank reserves, if the central bank can avoid paying interest on them.  
By monetizing debt, the government seeks to use inflation to finance its spending. In a 
deflationary environment such as the COVID-19 crisis, with economies shrinking by as much 
as one third on an annualized basis, monetization could help a central bank stabilize prices 
while providing a mechanism to fund rescue and stimulus programs.  
In the first part of this paper, we briefly describe how monetization can work. The central 
bank can buy government debt and not require repayment, or similarly, promise to roll that 
debt over indefinitely. Or it could create central-bank accounts for the public, an idea with 
growing support.1 A complication is that most central banks now pay interest on the reserves 
that banks hold with them. So just buying government debt would not be costless to the 
government; it would simply substitute the interest paid on Treasuries for the interest the 
central bank pays on reserves. We explain that, if a central bank has no choice but to pay 
interest on reserves, it would have to combine its government debt purchases with 
convincing guidance that it has temporarily raised its inflation target. The scope for using 
inflation for this purpose is related to the ratio of a country’s base money—currency plus 
non-interest-bearing bank reserves—to its gross domestic product (GDP). When modeled, a 
program that costs about one percent of GDP that is fully monetized corresponds to about a 
10 percent increase in the price level.2  
Of course, the mere hint of monetization conjures fears of government overreach and 
excessive inflation. Many countries do not allow their central banks to buy government debt 
 
1 Coronado, Julia, and Simon M. Potter. “Securing Macroeconomic and Monetary Stability with a Federal 
Reserve–Backed Digital Currency.” Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). Policy Brief 20-4. 
March 2020  
2 English, William B., Christopher J. Erceg, and David Lopez-Salido. “Money-Financed Fiscal Programs: A 
Cautionary Tale.” Brookings Institution: Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Working Paper #31. June 
2, 2017 – p. 1. 
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at all. Some allow only limited amounts to be purchased to cover short-term cash needs.3 
Others require the government to repay the central bank quickly.4 Milton Friedman, 
conservative economist and historian of the Great Depression, coined the term “helicopter 
money”—to escape a deflationary recession through money printing—50 years ago. Critics 
pounced on former Fed chair Ben Bernanke when he mentioned Friedman’s suggestion in 
2002, but he still has not backed down from his view that “governments should never have 
to give in to deflation.”5  
In the second part of this paper, we describe historical examples of monetization in practice. 
Quantitative-easing (QE) programs that various central banks introduced during and after 
the global financial crisis of 2007-09 were not monetization programs. Indeed, despite 
trillions of dollars of debt purchases by central banks, inflation hardly stirred. Banks held the 
new cash in reserves, the growth in the broader money supply remained muted, and the 
money multiplier shrank .6 As Janet Yellen, former Fed chair, and proposed future head of 
Treasury, recently intimated, central banks know how to subdue inflation, but deflation 
continues to puzzle them.7  
In these examples, a common concern expressed about monetization is that a central bank 
will lose its independence. Once a legislature realizes it has a limitless buyer for debt, the 
story goes, it will abandon all fiscal control. Such “fiscal dominance” is real. For example, it 
was explicit policy in India before a series of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.8 But Bernanke 
has argued that the record of central bank independence suggests that close cooperation 
between a country’s central bank and its treasury can be perfectly appropriate during 
difficult times, when their interests are clearly aligned.9 During the world wars, as we 
describe, the Fed temporarily monetized expansive fiscal policy at the expense of its 
independence.  
In the third part of the paper, we describe measures that central banks took in the first six 
months of the COVID-19 crisis that some described as monetization. Many central banks, 
including several in emerging markets, established or reinstated asset purchases and QE 
programs in 2020. Meanwhile, debt levels rose across the world, especially in developing 
 
3 Bank of England. “HM Treasury and Bank of England announce temporary extension to Ways and Means 
facility.” April 9, 2020. 
4 “Monetary Board approved additional Php 300 billion support to the National Government to fight COVID-
19.” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). March 22, 2020. 
5 Bernanke, Ben S. “What tools does the Fed have left? Part 3: Helicopter money.” Brookings Institution. April 
11, 2016. 
6 Dugal, Ira. “Monetisation Neither a Game Changer nor a Catastrophe, says Raghuram Rajam.” Bloomberg Quint. 
May 8, 2020. 
7 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS). “The Economic Policy Response to COVID-19.” July 13, 2020. 
8 Reserve Bank of India. “Fiscal-Monetary Co-ordination in India: An Assessment.” March 4, 2013. 
9 Bernanke, Ben S. “Monetary Policy in a new era.” Brookings Institution – Hutchins Center on Fiscal and 
Monetary Policy. October 2, 2017. 
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countries.10 Based on our research, however, no central bank explicitly labeled its programs 
monetization. On the contrary, several took measures to make clear that monetization was 
not part of their strategy. 
In the fourth part of the paper, we ask: If central banks wanted to monetize their debt to 
support their COVID-19 responses, would they be able to? Our analysis suggests that a 
country’s capacity for “safe” monetization depends on its level of economic development, the 
central bank’s credibility, and the current economic environment. Countries that have 
persistently low inflation, credible central banks, and strong economic fundamentals could 
potentially monetize some of their COVID-19 spending without excessive inflation or a loss 
of central bank independence. Countries that do not have a large amount of fiscal space and 
are struggling to obtain external financing or issue debt face greater risks from monetization.  
1. What is monetization? 
Most of the time, governments have two basic choices for financing their deficits: they can 
borrow (issue debt) or raise taxes. Monetization represents a third, unconventional choice 
that governments may consider in crises like the current one. 
What is it? Simply put, monetization—also known as “money-financed fiscal programs” or 
“money printing”—occurs when the government finances itself by issuing non-interest-
bearing liabilities: that is, either currency in circulation or central bank reserves, if the 
central bank can avoid paying interest on those reserves. 
Monetization can solve several problems for a government during the COVID-19 crisis. First, 
it can directly cover some of the costs of extraordinary recovery programs. Second, it can 
mitigate deflation and stimulate moderate inflation. Third, by increasing inflation, it can 
reduce to some extent the value of its outstanding obligations. Stimulating inflation is a 
necessary part of the plan. A central bank financing government spending—by purchasing 
government debt directly or crediting the government the amount needed—is not 
monetizing that spending unless it also stimulates inflation.  
The fact that most central banks now pay interest on bank reserves complicates the process 
of monetization.  
Without interest on reserves, monetizing debt would be easier. The government would issue 
enough bonds to pay for its fiscal program, and the central bank would then purchase those 
bonds, committing to hold them in perpetuity or to roll them over forever. The government 
would spend the “money” that the central bank has created on any short-term stimulus, or 
COVID relief, that it has identified as necessary. In the short run, that money would end up 
 
10 Sindreu, Jon. “Who Says Emerging Economies Shouldn’t Print Money?” The Wall Street Journal. June 30, 2020. 
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at banks, as people and businesses deposit their checks from the government. But banks 
wouldn’t want to keep their excess reserves with the central bank, where it earned no 
interest. Much of the money would flow back into the economy through loans, and thereby 
boost aggregate demand. The stronger demand would, in turn, increase inflation, which 
would gradually reduce the real value of currency and reserves back to their initial levels. As 
a consequence, the government would end up having financed its fiscal action by creating 
base money: by spurring growth in both reserves and currency. 
But, in reality, most of the largest central banks in the world do pay interest on reserves 
today.11 The interest rate they pay, even if it is small, gives banks an incentive to keep their 
reserves with the central bank. This confounds the process of monetization described above, 
since the interest the central bank pays on reserves merely substitutes for the interest 
payments the government pays on its debt. With a few key adjustments, financing 
government spending while paying interest on reserves can achieve results similar to the 
circumstance where the central bank doesn’t pay interest on reserves. 
With interest on reserves, a central bank would still directly purchase and commit to roll 
over the government’s debt to initially finance the fiscal program. But it would also commit 
to raising prices to a high enough level that the additional demand for nominal currency 
would be sufficient to finance the debt purchase. Essentially, this means that there would be 
some temporary but moderate inflation (say, above the common 2% target but still in single 
digits), which would reduce the real value of the currency stock and increase the demand for 
currency. As a result, seigniorage—the profit generated by the government from printing 
money—would be used to help finance the fiscal action.  
For this to work, the public must perceive the central bank’s commitment to expanding base 
money as credible and permanent. Otherwise, the short-run economic impact would be far 
less.12 The central bank could instead communicate that it would only monetize a certain 
amount of government debt. But committing to raise the price level alongside expansionary 
fiscal policy sends a stronger message to the public that the increase is indeed permanent; 
not articulating this message may have unpredictable effects on inflation.13 When modeled, 
a program that costs about 1 percent of GDP that is fully monetized corresponds to about a 
10 percent increase in the price level.14  
This scenario differs from how debt monetization has often been defined by media and some 
academics, where any purchase of government debt by the central bank is termed 
 
11 Nelson, William. “Why paying interest on reserves is good for lending.” American Banker. June 5, 2017. 
12English, William B., Christopher J. Erceg, and David Lopez-Salido. “Money-Financed Fiscal Programs: A 
Cautionary Tale.” Forthcoming – p. 3. 
13 English, Erceg, Lopez-Salido (Forthcoming) – p. 26. 
14 English, Erceg, Lopez-Salido (2017) – pp. 12-13. 
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monetization.15 But a central bank really is not monetizing if it finances its purchases through 
(interest-bearing) reserve creation and if it does not intend to raise the price level. By our 
definition, recent attempts to flood financial markets with liquidity via the purchase of 
government bonds (among other instruments) are not monetization. Nor are the Federal 
Reserve’s purchases of large amounts of Treasury debt as part of its quantitative easing (QE) 
programs during both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 crisis.16  
One of the biggest challenges in determining whether monetization has actually occurred is 
that it is not immediately clear whether debt purchases by the central bank satisfy the 
requirements that we have outlined above: rolling the debt over indefinitely, and 
temporarily committing to a higher price level. The Bank of Japan (BOJ), for instance, has 
continually purchased Japanese securities proportionate to the amount of the fiscal deficit 
over the past 25 years but has never explicitly stated that monetization is its intent.17 The 
size of its balance sheet has only increased and it has made no major efforts to sell its bond 
holdings. However, the BOJ financed these purchases through reserve creation; it has been 
unable to generate consistent inflation and spur demand for its domestic currency stock.18 
The BOJ in 2016 did say that it would be aiming to overshoot its inflation target while keeping 
the rates on government debt close to zero, an important step in a seigniorage-based 
monetization framework.19 Nonetheless, it has still undershot this target and has been 
unable to generate the seigniorage needed to pay for fiscal actions.20  
a. Why has monetization not been more widely used? 
The primary concern about engaging in monetization is the fear that it will lead to excessive 
and uncontrollable inflation. Since monetization is, by definition, a permanent increase in 
non-interest-bearing liabilities of the central bank (in this case, currency), the policy should 
be expected to lead to some inflation. However, this increase is intended and necessary in 
order to generate enough seigniorage to finance the fiscal program. The increased inflation 
generated is not inherently a bad thing if it is moderate, temporary, and communicated 
clearly by the central bank. Uncontrolled monetization can cause currency crises in fixed-
exchange-rate regimes and lead to excessive inflation. These crises can be exacerbated in 
less-developed countries with a substantial amount of foreign-currency-denominated debt, 
 
15 Cheng, Jeffrey, Dave Skidmore, and David Wessel. “What’s the Fed doing in response to the COVID-19 crisis? 
What more could it do?” Brookings Institution – Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy. July 17, 2020. 
16 “Recent balance sheet trends.” Federal Reserve Board of Governors, last updated November 30, 2020. 
17 Turner, Adair. “Monetary Finance is here.” Project Syndicate. April 20, 2020. 
18 “Bank of Japan Accounts.” The Bank of Japan, last updated December 2, 2020. 
19 Kihara, Keika, and Stanley White. “BOJ overhauls policy focus, sets target for government bond yields.” 
Reuters. September 21, 2016. 
20 “Inflation, consumer prices for Japan.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED), last updated December 2, 2020. 
6
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 2 Iss. 4
 
 
as the increase in domestic currency puts pressure on the exchange rate, weakening the 
domestic currency and increasing the cost of servicing their debt.  
A central bank in a fixed-exchange-rate regime under this sort of pressure may find that 
conventional methods of defending its currency (by raising interest rates, for instance) 
would create unacceptable economic costs at home. The central bank would have to choose 
between providing relief at the risk of breaking the peg, or defending the peg and allowing 
the economy to stagnate. “First-generation” currency crisis models address this very issue. 
These models outline a hypothetical country that runs persistent budget deficits while 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Eventually the government needs to monetize its deficit, 
putting downward pressure on the exchange rate, and the model predicts that the peg will 
break.21 Currency crises in Mexico and Turkey in the 1990s followed this model. 
This phenomenon can also occur if there is widespread circulation and usage of other 
currencies, as people will flock to these if the domestic currency is under pressure. The risk 
of excessive inflation reflects the degree of monetization and the characteristics of the 
economy doing it.  
Governments that have access to the printing press as a form of financing may also exercise 
far less fiscal discipline than otherwise. Issuing debt without the expectation of repayment 
could lead governments to spend excessively and overheat the economy.  
This concern underscores the importance of central bank independence. Adopting 
monetization as a regular part of a central bank’s toolkit, or even setting a precedent that it 
is available, could gradually erode the barriers between monetary and fiscal policy, 
damaging the central bank’s credibility and limiting its ability to fulfill its mandate. Central 
bank credibility is a nebulous concept, yet it is absolutely critical when thinking about the 
impact that monetization can have. There appears to be a general relationship between 
economic development and central bank credibility, but there are a variety of factors that 
can affect it. The erosion of credibility could unhinge inflation expectations. A fiscally 
irresponsible government ultimately puts any central bank in an impossible situation. If it 
does not monetize the deficits, interest rates on government debt will rise, which could 
increase the probability of default. Eventually, the central bank will have little choice but to 
monetize. This phenomenon—when a central bank is forced to monetize an unsustainable, 
out-of-control deficit to avoid negative economic outcomes—is known as fiscal dominance.22 
Thus, long-run fiscal sustainability is key in ensuring that central banks are able to fulfill 
 
21 Glick, Reuven, and Michael Hutchison. “Currency Crises.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. September 
2011. 
22 Mishkin, Frederic S. “Central Banking After the Crisis.” Columbia University Graduate School of Business and 
National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2012 – pp. 34-37. 
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their price-stability mandates and remain credible. The lack of fiscal discipline ultimately 
affects the independence of the central bank. 
There are other issues. Monetization can circumvent the market-pricing mechanism in 
secondary markets by allowing the government to issue debt at lower interest rates. The Fed 
expressed this concern back in 1917, when the U.S. Treasury offered it $50 million in bonds 
at far below-market rates. The cheap credit for the government can also lead to moral-hazard 
concerns, if the central bank commits to low interest rates along the yield curve. Excessive 
spending could also lead to crowding out of private borrowers, though this may not be an 
issue if the central bank doesn’t allow interest rates to rise. These are some reasons why 
monetization has been generally characterized as a last-resort authority.23  
2. How has monetization been used historically?  
Governments have used monetization most often in the past as a mechanism for war 
financing. Wars are typically financed through some combination of taxation, debt financing, 
external financing, and monetization. Monetization is typically the easiest option, provided 
that central bankers are willing to cooperate. During wartime, it generally is not a politically 
sensitive policy and can be operationalized quickly. To finance huge wartime production 
needs via monetization, governments issue bonds that are then purchased directly by the 
central bank. The question of central bank independence does not have to arise in this case, 
since the incentives of the central bank and government are aligned. 
Below are discussions of different countries’ experiences with monetization, successful or 
not. In some cases, such as the Weimar Republic or Zimbabwe, the decision to monetize 
resulted in rampant hyperinflation. In others, like Japan during the Great Depression or 
France after World War I, monetization proved more effective.  
a. The United States 
In the U.S., Section 14 of the original Federal Reserve Act allowed the Fed to directly purchase 
government bonds. The earliest use of this authority was in 1917 during World War I, when 
Treasury Secretary William McAdoo offered $50 million in three-month notes to Federal 
Reserve banks.24 The Board of Governors was not happy, as the interest rates were below 
market rates, but ultimately acquiesced.25 After World War I, the government continued to 
use this authority, albeit only for cash-management purposes, until Congress prohibited it in 
1935. At the time, some policymakers expressed concerns about chronic deficits, the erosion 
 
23 Bernanke, “Helicopter money.”  
24 Garbade, Kenneth D. “Direct Purchases of U.S. Treasury Securities by Federal Reserve Banks.” Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. August 2014 – p. 2. 
25 Garbade, “Direct Purchases.” – p. 3. 
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of fiscal discipline, and ballooning Federal Reserve balance sheets. Treasury questioned 
Congress’s decision, arguing that the Fed’s ability to make direct purchases could be crucial 
in times of crisis.26 Congress eventually accepted this argument. In 1942, it inserted a 
wartime exception that allowed the Fed to underwrite Treasury debt. But the exception was 
subject to a $5 billion limit.27 It was really just an overdraft privilege for the U.S. government 
to use when it was cash-poor, most notably around tax-collection dates.  This exception, as 
well as other overdraft facilities, do not constitute monetization based on our definition. 
Of the major wars that the U.S. participated in after World War I—that is, after the Fed 
became a truly independent central bank—it financed World War II only in part through 
monetization, based on our definition.28 The Fed used the exception to help facilitate 
Treasury cash balances on tax collection dates during the war.29 Because of the exception’s 
limited size, however, the U.S. relied primarily on borrowing, and its debt ballooned from 
$51 billion in 1940 to over $260 billion in 1945.30  
In doing so, the Fed committed to pegging interest rates at low levels and offered an even 
lower preferential rate for loans secured by short-term government obligations.31 The Fed’s 
balance sheet grew massively in its effort to keep rates low; its holdings of government 
securities rose from $2.5 billion at the end of 1939 to $24.3 billion at the end of 1945. 
Wartime price controls and rationing temporarily mitigated the inflationary effects, but their 
removal after the war caused a surge in the price level, which prompted the Fed to increase 
reserve requirements.32 After World War II, the Fed used the wartime exception sparingly 
until it was allowed to expire in 1981. 
The Korean War was financed entirely through taxation, due to high post-World War II 
inflation and broad public support.33 Nonetheless, high inflation in 1951 forced the 
reintroduction of wage and price controls.34  
Although the Fed did not monetize wartime debt during the Korean War, its independence 
was tested because it continued to maintain its low interest-rate peg. The Fed attempted to 
raise rates throughout 1950, believing the peg to be inflationary, but was blocked by the 
 
26 Garbade, “Direct Purchases.” – p. 5. 
27 Garbade, “Direct Purchases.” – pp. 9-10. 
28 Labonte, Marc, and Mindy Levit. “Financing Issues and Economic Effects of American Wars.” Congressional 
Research Service. July 29, 2008 – p. 3. 
29 Labonte and Levit, “American Wars.” – p. 10. 
30 See “Historical Debt Outstanding.” Treasurydirect.gov, last updated October 2, 2020; “Historical Debt 
Outstanding – Annual 1900–1949.” Treasurydirect.gov, last updated May 5, 2013. 
31 Richardson, Gary. “Federal Reserve’s Role during WWII.” Federal Reserve History. November 22, 2013. 
32 English, Erceg, Lopez-Salido (2017) – p. 25. 
33 Cappella, Rosella. “The Political Economy of War Finance.” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2012. 
34 Labonte and Levit, “American Wars.” – p. 8. 
9
Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19 Lawson and Feldberg
 
 
Treasury to keep the government’s  debt-service costs manageable.35 After a meeting 
between the Fed Chair and President Truman in early 1951, the President committed the 
Fed, without its consent, to maintaining the peg during the Korean War, just as it had done 
during the two world wars. This conflict between the mandate of the Fed and needs of the 
Treasury ultimately resulted in the Treasury-Fed Accord, which stated that the Treasury and 
Fed remained committed to financing the government’s needs while minimizing outright Fed 
purchases of the debt.36 
b. Germany, Austria, and Poland after World War I 
Governments have been known to continue financing their deficits through monetization 
even after a war has ended. After World War I, such policies led to out-of-control hyper-
inflation, with prices rising by factors of two or more per month, in Weimar Germany (1923), 
Austria (1922), and Poland (1924-27).  
In the case of Germany, a reduced tax base, increased debt service, unrealistic reparation 
demands from the victors, and the erosion of the value of tax revenues through inflation 
created huge budget deficits. The central bank first attempted to solve this by fixing the 
exchange rate to slow inflation, which worked while the Reichsbank had sufficient reserves 
to support it. Ultimately, though, the central bank could not defend the peg and abandoned 
it, which necessitated further reform. The German government passed legislation in October 
1923 that created a new currency. Under the legislation, the central bank could no longer 
purchase government debt. The government also raised taxes and reduced outlays.37 The 
new currency, the Retenmark, had a limited issuance and was backed by claims on industry 
and agriculture. One of the most important uses of the new currency was a “once and for all 
allocation” to the government to help it retire its existing debt while it passed fiscal 
reforms.38 The central bank quickly got inflation and the exchange rate under control by 
pushing interest rates to extremely high levels, as high as 20% per day in December 1923. In 
1924, a substantial reduction in reparations expectations and a large loan from the U.S. 
helped restore the fiscal and monetary balance. 
Similarly, during and after the first world war, Austria increasingly funded its deficits via the 
printing press, which led to massive inflation and depreciation. Currency in circulation rose 
by nearly 1000% from the beginning to the end of the war.39 The postwar government 
imposed artificially low price controls on agricultural products and enacted massive food 
 
35 Hetzel, Robert L., and Ralph F. Leach. “The Treasury-Fed Accord: A New Narrative Account.” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Vol. 87/1 Winter (2001): 33-55. Accessed December 3, 2020 – p. 114. 
36 Romero, Jesse. “Treasury-Fed Accord.” Federal Reserve History. November 22, 2013. 
37 Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Stanley Fischer. “Stopping Hyperinflations Past and Present.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research. January 1986 – pp. 8-16. 
38 Dornbusch and Fischer, “Hyperinflations Past and Present.” – p. 11. 
39 Ebeling, Richard M. “The Great Austrian Inflation.” Foundation for Economic Education. April 1, 2006. 
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subsidies. Excessive inflation turned into hyperinflation in 1921 and continued into 1922. 
Inflation in the third quarter of 1922 was at an annual rate of 130,000%.40 To stabilize, the 
government received a large foreign loan and was required to bring its budget back in line.  
It took the Polish government three separate attempts to stabilize its economy from 
hyperinflation. Military conflict continued in Poland even after the end of World War I, and 
the government committed over 50 percent of its budgetary resources to defense 
spending.41 Due to a small tax base, most of these expenses were financed through the 
printing of Polish marks. As was the case in Germany and Austria, currency in circulation 
increased quickly, and depreciation followed. The government introduced austerity 
measures, which prompted a modest appreciation of the mark, but it did not stick to them 
and the inflation worsened. It then raised taxes, “valorizing” them, or indexing them to gold, 
and issuing a new currency that was pegged to the dollar. Initially these measures appeared 
to work. But budgetary and economic issues forced the central bank to defend the peg, and 
it ultimately broke. The money supply kept growing because the Treasury continued to issue 
small notes and mint coins, although the central bank was actively removing notes to defend 
the currency. Stabilization was finally achieved via a large U.S. and British loan and 
regulatory reforms that prevented the government from issuing treasury notes.  
Each of these countries had extremely high postwar deficits that were almost entirely 
monetized and significant real economic and political turmoil that was worsened by other 
forces: punitive reparations (Germany), governmental instability and incompetence 
(Austria), or generally poor fiscal discipline (Poland). The Reichsbank in Germany purchased 
any and all of the government debt that the private sector did not want, providing the 
government a seemingly bottomless well of financing.42 The National Bank of Austria had the 
authority to provide credit to the state, and did so out of “fear for upheaval, social chaos, and 
anarchy.”43 During World War I, occupying German forces created the Polish National Credit 
Bank that functioned as a temporary bank of issue until the Bank of Poland was established. 
It financed sky-high war expenditures using the printing press and continued to do so after 
the war due to a lack of fiscal capacity.44 The degree of separation between central banks and 
finance ministries that is commonplace today simply did not exist. The central banks or 
 
40 Dornbusch and Fischer, “Hyperinflations Past and Present.” – p. 18. 
41 Lopez, Jose A., and Kris James Mitchener. “Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after 
World War I.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco – p. 9. 
42 Webb, Steven B. “The Supply of Money and Reichsbank Financing of Government and Corporate Debt in 
Germany, 1919–1923.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 44, No.2, (Jun. 1984): 499–507. Accessed 
December 3, 2020 – p. 501. 
43 Beer, Christian, Ernest Gnan, and Maria Teresa Valderrama. “A (not so brief) history of inflation in Austria.” 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). 2016 – pp. 13-14. 
44 von Thadden, Goetz Henning. “Inflation in the Reconstruction of Poland, 1918–1927.” (PhD diss., London 
School of Economics and Political Science, September 30, 1994 – p. 10. 
11
Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19 Lawson and Feldberg
 
 
banks of issue in these countries were largely subordinate to the fiscal authorities, making it 
impossible for them to establish credibility and manage inflation.  
In each of these cases, stabilization was achieved through the dramatic reduction of budget 
deficits, usage or proposal of foreign loans, and exchange-rate pegs. However, solely relying 
on a strict peg, or even a narrow band of exchange-rate targeting, may not be sufficient to 
stabilize the economy since a peg may not be sustainable. Fiscal discipline was necessarily 
enforced and regulatory reforms or legal restrictions limiting governments issuing money 
were eventually introduced.  
c. Turkey in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, Turkey experienced a serious economic crisis that had roots in excessive 
monetization. Turkey’s economy rapidly expanded throughout the 1980s and early ’90s; 
meanwhile, the government relied increasingly on monetization to finance huge deficits.45 
This lack of fiscal discipline, coupled with huge inflows of “hot” money from foreign investors 
and repeated financing conflicts with the central bank, eroded confidence and caused a 
currency crisis in 1994, and the economy spiraled into recession in 1999. Because of the 
significant dollarization of the economy, the monetary authority was unable to combat the 
recession because it had to raise interest rates to ward off downward pressure on the 
Turkish lira.46 Ultimately, Turkey received a three-year IMF Standby Arrangement that 
required the authorities to curb the excessive inflation and reform their institutions and 
regulations.  
d. Zimbabwe in the late 2000s 
Perhaps the most noteworthy and most recent example of monetization-induced 
hyperinflation is Zimbabwe in the late 2000s. From 1980 to 1999, the country experienced 
modest growth, but the country’s public debt climbed as the government spent heavily on 
bonuses for war veterans, involvements in other conflicts, and debt service to the IMF. The 
agriculturally focused country also experienced periods of heavy droughts and land 
reallocation at the turn of the century, depressing output dramatically.47 Instead of financing 
these costs through taxation or issuing debt, the government—already managing a weak 
economy—heavily monetized them. By 2008, continuously monetized deficits created a 
deep currency depreciation that wiped out citizens’ net worth and reduced GDP per capita 
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below the level it had been 50 years earlier.48 In response, the government introduced harsh 
price controls, which led to rampant shortages of key goods. The U.S. dollar, which was 
already one of the de facto currencies in the wake of this crisis, became the primary currency.  
e. France 
France’s performance during and after World War I offers a more encouraging example of 
monetization. It depended heavily on borrowing and money growth to finance its 
expenditures during the war and saw its price level more than double.49 While the 
government faced considerable challenges—a large debt-to-GDP ratio, huge budget deficits, 
damage from the war—its economy rebounded significantly.50 This was because the Bank of 
France eased monetary policy and allowed the value of the franc to fall significantly before 
eventually repegging it to gold at a lower level in 1926. This decision increased inflation, 
which reduced the debt-to-GDP ratio, and also significantly increased output over time.51 On 
the other hand, the UK, which adopted a much tighter monetary stance and returned to its 
prewar peg to gold, saw much more sluggish growth.52  
France, in contrast to Germany, Austria, and Poland, did not exclusively finance its 
involvement in World War I through monetization. France, as a victor in the war, did not face 
the same fiscal imbalances that Germany and Austria did. Poland, which was partitioned by 
Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Russia at the start of the war, faced considerable political and 
economic turmoil even after the war’s conclusion.53 The French people may have also seen 
the Bank of France’s change in monetary policy as credible in the face of its difficult fiscal 
circumstances.54 Had France attempted to follow the UK’s example of repegging earlier, it is 
likely that the adverse economic outcomes would have seriously damaged the government’s 
credibility.55  
f. Japan during the Great Depression 
Japan’s performance during the Great Depression offers another encouraging example. 
Similar to France, its central bank and treasury cooperated in a monetary expansion, 
allowing it to recover quickly under the “Takahashi economic policy,” named after finance 
minister Korekiyo Takahashi. Japan experienced double-digit deflation in 1930 and 1931, 
but Takahashi promoted expansionary exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies starting 
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53 Allen, Erin. “World War I: Restoring Poland.” Library of Congress Blog. January 25, 2017. 
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at the end of 1931.56 The country first moved off the gold standard, prompting a substantial 
devaluation of the yen; eased monetary policy; and introduced massive fiscal stimulus. All of 
these measures were explicitly financed by the Bank of Japan. Consumer prices rebounded 
shortly thereafter and GDP per capita began recovering in 1932. This recovery can be 
partially attributed to the fact that the Japanese people viewed these policy changes as 
credible, much in the same way that the French did during their stabilization.57 
Takahashi, worried about the inflationary consequences of continuing to finance 
government expenditures in this way, pushed back against further monetization.58 He was 
assassinated during a coup in 1935 due to his decision to cut government—specifically 
military—spending.59 In the words of former Fed chairman and Great Depression scholar 
Ben Bernanke, Takahashi had “brilliantly rescued” Japan and allowed it to rebound rapidly 
from the Depression, even while many other nations were still suffering.60  
It is important to note that, in all of these examples, monetization was the primary, often the 
only, tool to finance profligate spending—for wars or otherwise. The governments in our 
modern examples—Turkey and Zimbabwe—followed similar paths. Turkey financed rapid 
economic expansion via monetization and saw large foreign capital inflows, leading to an 
increased debt burden, further monetization, and less confidence, which culminated in a 
currency crisis. The government of Zimbabwe faced a mixture of problems with key sectors 
(agriculture), spent frivolously, and chose to not rely on conventional methods of financing. 
While external factors, such as crushing war reparation burdens in the case of Weimar 
Germany or a turbulent period of interwar occupation, in the case of Poland, contributed to 
postwar economic hardship, the consistent lack of fiscal discipline and the partial or 
complete subordination of the central bank to the government across all the examples were 
the catalysts to extremely damaging economic crises.  
In contrast, the French and Japanese experiences offer more hopeful lessons. They did not 
have to rely exclusively on the printing press to finance expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy; they had stronger, more credible central banks; and they attempted to curtail 
excessive spending and depreciation after they were on the road to recovery. France 
repegged to gold at a lower level, and Takahashi’s  bold decision to move off the gold 
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standard and promote expansionary monetary and fiscal policies allowed Japan to rebound 
from the initial shock of the Great Depression very strongly.   
g. Is there a difference between war financing and pandemic financing? 
Much of the criticism of monetization centers on the fear that, if it is extended, it will prevent 
the central bank from fulfilling its price-stability mandate—through excessive inflation, loss 
of independence, or some combination of the two. However, some forget that this type of 
monetary-fiscal cooperation is often seen in times of war.  
Wars typically entail dramatic but temporary increases in government spending and 
borrowing to adequately address the conflict. In the case of World War II, for instance, the 
United States ran budget deficits in excess of 27 percent of GDP.61 The Federal Reserve 
relinquished some of its independence to cooperate with the U.S. government during both 
world wars, but it was able to return to its mandate and retain independence once they 
ended.62 
Something to consider is that, historically, pandemics and wars have impacted economies 
very differently. The real “natural” rate of interest in the decades following a major pandemic 
is 1.5 percentage points lower about 20 years later.63 Pandemics, which often result in 
massive losses of life, and thus, labor, rebalance the relative returns to labor and capital. 
Wars, on the other hand, cause the destruction of both capital and labor. The added 
destruction of capital during a war causes the natural rate of interest to rise—the opposite 
effect as a pandemic—over the same amount of time.64 While these differences exist, 
academics have suggested that the potential decline in real interest rates from COVID-19 
may not be as severe as during wartime. The deaths from COVID-19 have made up a smaller 
proportion of the total population and those that have lost their lives are generally older, and 
thus not in the labor force. Also, aggressive fiscal policies, which lead to higher debt burdens, 
can put upward pressure on interest rates.65 Monetization of these programs, however, 
would depress the real interest rate for a time. We do not yet know the full extent of the 
damage that will be caused by COVID-19, so the potential stagnation described above could 
still be a concern. 
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Wars often necessitate more monetary-fiscal cooperation than what convention suggests is 
wise, but it’s helpful to have the central bank backing the government to ensure it has 
everything it needs to address the conflict. The sharp but temporary increase in deficit 
spending during a war mirrors what countries are doing currently to combat COVID-19. 
While monetization could produce some negative impacts, the similarities between the 
COVID-19 crisis and wartimes, from a public financing standpoint, are strikingly similar.  
3. Were central banks monetizing government debt in 2020? 
Based on our definition, it does not seem that any country conducted monetization in the 
initial response to COVID-19. Many central banks, including several in emerging markets, 
established or reinstated asset purchases and QE programs in 2020; and debt levels only 
rose, precipitously in some developing countries.66 Based on our research, though, no central 
bank has explicitly labeled its programs as monetization. On the contrary, several have taken 
measures to make clear that monetization is not part of their strategy.  
a. Philippines 
The Banko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) in the Philippines purchased about $6 billion in 
securities from the government in March, but with the understanding that the government 
would repurchase the securities after six months.67 The government repaid the BSP at the 
end of September.68 This explicit exit target, as well as the absence of a commitment to 
increase the price level, suggests that the central bank, while cooperating with the fiscal 
authority, did not intend to monetize this spending.  
b. Indonesia 
In Indonesia, government debt tripled in the fight against COVID-19. The government first 
issued a regulation that allowed Bank Indonesia (BI) to directly purchase newly issued 
government debt as a last resort.69 It later proposed auctioning off about $30 billion in 
“pandemic bonds,” most of which BI would purchase.70 But the government never issued the 
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pandemic bonds, saying it could obtain financing through traditional auctions.71 BI could still 
participate in other auctions if needed. Foreign demand for Indonesian debt fell, but 
domestic lenders and banks, supported by BI’s liquidity measures, increased their holdings. 
The finance minister predicted on June 8 that the budget deficit would rise as high as 6.34 
percent of GDP this year.72 According to its finance minister, the country’s deficit through 
October was estimated at about 4.67 percent of GDP.73 Later, the government and BI agreed 
to a proposal under which BI would purchase about $40 billion in government bonds; the 
interest rate would be at market levels, rather than zero as originally proposed.74 It appeared 
likely that BI would hold on to these bonds through 2021.75 It appeared doubtful that BI 
would monetize this debt, though, as BI did not issue guidance signaling that it was 
committing to a higher price level following these purchases. 
c. China 
There was also some discussion about monetization in China.76 The People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) is not permitted by law to directly buy sovereign debt or provide an overdraft facility 
to the government. However, the country still had significant monetary and fiscal space that 
it could use to enact other forms of relief without monetizing those costs.  
d. India 
India kept the door to monetization open, but it had not yet acted at the end of 2020.77 Like 
many central banks, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) actively purchased government bonds. 
However, it only did so in secondary markets and for limited amounts, as direct purchases 
were outlawed in 2003.78 In the early days after India’s independence, its government could 
achieve monetization automatically by issuing ad-hoc treasury bills “on-tap” directly to the 
RBI. A series of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s set some limits on this explicit form of fiscal 
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dominance. The government adopted a market-based pricing system for auctions of 
sovereign debt, phased out the usage of ad-hoc treasury bills, and completely outlawed 
primary market purchases of debt by the RBI.79 Some direct government finance occurred 
during the GFC through the use of Special Market Operations (SMOs), which allowed certain 
public companies (namely those in the oil sector) to sell bonds directly to the RBI to meet 
foreign exchange requirements. These were used sparingly, however.  
A former RBI governor said in April 2020, that monetization was “inevitable” as the 
pandemic and calls for further stimulus continued.80 The country’s healthcare infrastructure 
was strained. Many in the government were concerned about the potential for excessive 
inflation and the return of fiscal dominance.81 An escape clause in the law allowed the central 
bank to purchase government debt during times of crisis. This would allow the government 
to borrow from the RBI for temporary, cash-management needs and for the RBI to purchase 
government debt on primary markets during periods of significant economic stress, national 
emergency, or war.82 
e. The United Kingdom 
The Bank of England (BoE) expanded the scope of its standing overdraft facility, called the 
Ways and Means facility, for COVID-19-related expenditures.83 Historically, the facility has 
been used for cash-management purposes, similar to the wartime exception in the U.S. 
during the world wars. It was drawn on for nearly £20 billion in 2008 during the Global 
Financial Crisis.84 The BoE justified this decision by stating that the facility was necessary to 
support the economy and meet its inflation target and that doing so did not subordinate the 
BoE to the government. A member of its monetary policy committee noted that this freedom 
of action is what separates the BoE’s use of the overdraft facility today from historical 
monetary disasters in the Weimar Republic or Zimbabwe.85 Despite the government 
ramping up debt issuance to finance COVID-19 relief, the central bank did not use this facility 
in 2020.  
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The BoE’s Asset Purchase Facility dramatically increased its purchases of government debt 
in 2020 as HM Treasury continues to issue more debt.86 Despite this, BoE governor Andrew 
Bailey repeatedly stated that governments should not become reliant on central banks 
buying their debt through extensive asset-purchase programs. He said these programs have 
more in common with QE programs—they are crisis-focused and temporary by design. 
Additionally, he stated that the BoE would be looking to reduce its balance sheet before 
raising interest rates.87 This is a departure from previous thinking. Bailey’s predecessor, 
Mark Carney, argued for just the opposite after the GFC.88 The BoE under Carney viewed 
interest rates as a more easily adjustable policy tool.89 Bailey, however, said he did not wish 
huge central bank holdings of government bonds to become the norm.90 
f. Summary of COVID case studies 
None of these recent examples meet our definition of monetization, although many 
observers have used the word to describe them.91 We have yet to find an example of any 
monetary authority that is explicitly engaging in monetization.92 Many central banks are 
purchasing government debt, including through QE programs, alongside large fiscal 
expansions. Those are aggressive, even unprecedented crisis-fighting measures. But they are 
not monetization. In none of these cases is the central bank using non-interest-bearing 
liabilities (cash), and, by extension, seigniorage, to finance the purchase of government debt. 
The Federal Reserve is the only central bank that has made any sort of commitment to be 
more accommodative of inflation and to moderately, but temporarily, exceed its inflation 
target.93 However, the U.S. Congress did not pass any new fiscal relief in the months after the 
Fed made that announcement. 
On the other hand, even though the Bank of England aggressively purchased newly issued 
government debt, it stated that it remained confident that it would be able to continue to 
fulfill its mandate while increasing its involvement in the government bond market.94 The 
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BoE did not coordinate with the fiscal authorities by issuing forward guidance to raise its 
inflation targets, suggesting that it was not monetizing.  
4. Do central banks have the scope to monetize their debt? 
If central banks wanted to monetize their debt to support their COVID-19 responses, would 
they be able to? 
Based on our analysis, a country’s capacity for “safe” monetization depends on its level of 
economic development, the central bank’s credibility, and the current economic 
environment. However, there is no clear tipping point where the inflationary and governance 
issues discussed above suddenly converge. Countries that have persistently low inflation, 
credible central banks, and strong economic fundamentals could potentially monetize some 
of their COVID-19 spending without excessive inflation or a loss of central bank 
independence. These countries generally have undershot their inflation targets and have 
central banks that are well equipped to handle changes in the price level. A country like 
Japan, which has struggled more than any other country to generate enough inflation to hit 
its target, might actually find it difficult to convince the public of its commitment to a higher 
price level. 
Traditional debt financing, particularly for countries that already have high levels of debt, 
could still be an issue, with investors potentially questioning a sovereign’s ability to fulfill its 
obligations and influencing expected future default probabilities. Deficits rose rapidly in 
2020, raising questions about which nations would be able to reliably pay back what they 
owe. This has created a difficult situation for countries that did not have a large amount of 
fiscal space and were struggling to obtain external financing or issue debt. These countries 
do not have the same capacity for “conventional” (in other words, tax-based or debt-based) 
financing, and so it may have been tempting for them to monetize and do so for longer. 
However, their risks were also much greater. Poorly managed monetization could lead to a 
de-anchoring of inflation expectations, a loss of central bank credibility, and the inability for 
the central bank to be able to fight the excessive inflation. Central banks in these countries 
may also be more susceptible to governmental influence and fiscal dominance.  
Tables 1 and 2 below break down these concerns. Table 1 charts the capacity that various 
types of countries had to engage in “conventional” tax or debt-based) financing. Table 2 
charts countries’ varying capacity to conduct monetization. It is clear from this rough 
analysis that financing capacity was quite disparate across countries. Countries that could 
potentially benefit the most from monetization due to a lack of conventional financing 
capacity could also be most susceptible to its risks. 
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Despite these risks, some have argued that developing countries still may be able to monetize 
a portion of their debts, provided they have a flexible exchange-rate regime and are issuing 
debt mostly in their local currency.95 Foreign ownership of local-currency government bonds 
in many countries has steadily increased. Investors usually have U.S. dollar-based liabilities, 
which increases the risk of a fire sale of local government debt. However, their central banks 
are positioned to function as purchasers of last resort if this occurs.  
Operationalizing monetization requires some additional thought. Using reserve creation for 
monetization assumes a world in which there is no interest paid on reserves, which is not 
the world we live in. The aid extended by a fiscal program will inevitably end up in the 
banking system, which will increase the amount of bank reserves at the central bank. In times 
of stress, banks are reluctant to lend, so they are likely to keep these excess reserves at the 
central bank and earn interest on them.96 The central bank, by paying for the program 
initially using reserves, has simply substituted interest payments that the government would 
pay on debt for interest paid on reserves.  
Central banks could opt to pay very low, or even zero interest on the bank reserves created 
in this way, which would discourage banks from parking their cash, encourage lending, and 
ensure that the exercise is costless to both the central bank and the government.97 Another 
method involves the central bank levying an adjustable charge on banks—one on total 
liabilities, for instance—that would be sufficient to offset the interest paid on reserves.98 
This, however, amounts to a tax on the banking system and has its own issues. Concerns 
about fiscal dominance and central bank independence could potentially be alleviated if the 
government had a permanent account at the central bank that would be filled only when the 
central bank deemed monetary financing appropriate.99  
As for the problem of interest on reserves, a longer-run solution for central banks would be 
for them to gradually reduce their reserves and return to an environment where they no 
longer pay interest on them. However, this would be exceptionally time-consuming and 
require major central banks to coordinate amongst one another about how to unwind their 
balance sheets. Given these limitations, it would be much more effective to finance a fiscal 
program with reserve creation initially and seigniorage in the long run, rather than reserve 
creation exclusively. 
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There are reasons to be cautious, but as the costs of COVID-19 continue to mount, so too have 
the sizes of government deficits and, with them, the calls for monetization. It is a powerful 
emergency tool, capable of providing substantial stimulus and a dramatic reduction in real 
interest rates if it is communicated successfully and seen as credible.100 However, it is 
unclear how much monetization developing countries could safely conduct, if any.  
a. What are some alternatives to monetization during COVID-19? 
For developing countries for whom monetization appears difficult, debt relief may be the 
only alternative in the COVID-19 crisis. On April 15, 2020, the G20 announced the Debt 
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI).101 It provided relief from sovereign debt payments to 
G20 members for International Development Association (IDA) countries and least 
developed countries (LDCs). A total of 77 countries are eligible for the DSSI, which 
suspended debt service payments through the end of 2020 for participating countries. 
Approximately $11 billion could be freed up this way.102  
There are some challenges, however. Debt relief may be too small or too narrow in scope to 
effectively reduce massive debt stocks. Many of the DSSI-eligible countries need relief from 
private-sector creditors coordinating with sovereign ones for debt relief, as they owe a 
collective $13 billion to them through the end of the year. But negotiations with the private 
sector were done on a case-by-case basis, and there were likely to be some holdouts, which 
could mean that countries would have to pay those creditors in full.103 There are also a 
number of middle-income countries that have higher debt burdens and were expected to run 
much higher deficits.104 These countries also tend to rely more on private creditors, which 
can exacerbate holdout issues.105 In October 2020 the G20 extended DSSI relief until June 31, 
2021, and agreed to meet again before the program’s expiration to discuss a second 
extension.106 However, the DSSI has had mixed results. As of November, only 46 of the 77 
eligible countries applied for DSSI relief, and only 35 have had relief finalized. Additionally, 
private creditors, whose participation is voluntary, had not participated in any significant 
way, meaning that any money obtained via DSSI relief provided by governments 
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immediately would go to private creditors.107 The Yale Program on Financial Stability has 
additional materials about the impact of the DSSI.108 
Another alternative is financial repression. This typically takes the form of policies that allow 
the government to “tax” savers, such as through interest-rate caps, capital controls, and other 
policies. Financial repression can help a country reduce nominal interest rates, alleviating 
the debt service burden and ultimately reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.109 The U.S. used 
financial repression extensively after World War II, and real interest rates during this time 
were negative about half the time.110 Ultimately, financial repression “played an 
instrumental role in reducing or liquidating the massive stocks of debt accumulated during 
World War II.”111  
As with debt relief, financial repression is not without its challenges. Enforcing low interest 
rates can lead to inefficient allocation of savings, and successful implementation may require 
a level of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities that may call into question 
the independence of the central bank.  
Another option is a combination of tax increases and spending cuts, or austerity. These 
appear to be unlikely options, as they are politically unpopular and can harm economic 
recovery. Spain’s efforts at fighting the virus were initially hamstrung by austerity measures 
they adopted in the wake of the GFC, which led to a number of shortages of equipment, 
doctors, and hospital beds.112 The government of India circulated a memorandum that stated 
that it would suspend the commencement of all new publicly funded programs aside from 
those in their approximately $260 billion pandemic response package.113 Ecuador 
announced austerity measures in May, which will result in the closure or merging of several 
public companies and potentially thousands of layoffs.114 The decision sparked massive 
protests across the country, similar to the reaction that occurred after the government 
negotiated an austerity-laden $4.2 billion agreement with the IMF in March 2019 for 
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110 Reinhart, Carmen M., and M. Belen Sbrancia. “The Liquidation of Government Debt.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research. March 2011.  
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economic support.115 The IMF and Ecuadorian government cancelled this agreement in May 
and agreed to a different aid package worth about $6.5 billion in August 2020.116 
Additionally, Ecuador was able to restructure about $17.4 billion of external debt as a result 
of this IMF agreement being reached.117 However, these agreements are all contingent on 
Ecuador being able to implement austerity (called “fiscal consolidation”) measures 
amounting to about 5.5 percent of GDP over the next five years.118 
5. Conclusions 
Monetization, that is, financing government expenditures through issuance of non-interest-
bearing central bank liabilities, poses real risks—potentially excessive inflation and 
encroachment on central-bank independence. Some paint monetization as a relic of a bygone 
era. The onset of the COVID-19 crisis, however, forced governments to spend heavily to 
combat the considerable economic and public-health impacts. As deficits climbed and 
external investors remained cautious about where to place their capital, monetization re-
entered the conversation as a potential avenue to avoid massive debt burdens that some 
nations, particularly those in the developing world, may face.  
However, much of what many are calling monetization today is not really monetization. In 
particular, many central banks are conducting extensive purchases of government bonds—
but they financed these purchases with newly created interest-bearing reserves rather than 
through a temporary commitment to increase the price level. This means that they were not 
generating seigniorage via increased inflation and weren’t really monetizing, even though 
they could hold the bonds until maturity and roll them over indefinitely. The characteristics 
of debt securities purchased via quantitative-easing programs can make it difficult to tell if 
the purchases are permanent; it could be up to 30 years before some of the debt matures and 
needs to either be retired or rolled over. To our knowledge, no central bank during the 
COVID-19 crisis took an action that met our definition or explicitly stated that it was 
conducting monetization.  
The extent to which a country is able to conduct either explicit or even “implicit” 
monetization depends on its level of economic development, the credibility and 
independence of its central bank, and the general economic environment. This makes 
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monetization more attractive for countries that may not be able to obtain sufficient financing 
through debt issuance, taxation, or external finance (such as through the IMF).  
However, these countries are often much more vulnerable to the inflationary and 
governance risks associated with the practice. A counterargument is that not fighting the 
crisis forcefully enough could have medium or long-run economic effects that are worse than 
the risk of some inflation. Central banks are well-equipped to deal with inflation, but the 
historical examples of excessive inflation, spurred by a loss of central-bank credibility and a 
de-anchoring of inflation expectations, serve as a cautionary tale.  
Monetization has primarily been used in the past to help finance wartime expenditures. The 
Fed financed deficits as high as 27% of GDP during World War II. Central banks may sacrifice 
some of their independence and ability to manage inflation in favor of fiscal objectives in 
such situations, albeit for a very limited period to avert a crisis. From a public financing 
standpoint, a substantial, but temporary, economic shock, whether through war or disease, 
could be a dangerous enough emergency to demand similarly substantial and temporary 
cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities. As World Bank Chief Economist 
Carmen Reinhart said recently: “This is a war. In a war, you worry about winning the war, 
and then you worry about paying for it.”119 
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